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There is a largely unrecognized ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope.
Disambiguation throws into relief two fundamentally different conceptions of a trope
and provides two ways to understand and develop each metaphysical theory that
puts tropes to use. In this paper I consider the relative merits that result from
differences concerning a trope’s ability to ground the character of ordinary objects. I
argue that, on each conception of a trope, there are unique implications and
challenges concerning character-grounding.
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1. Introduction
Trope theory has it that properties are non-shareable. If two billiard balls a and b exist
simultaneously, the sphericality of a and the sphericality of b are exactly similar but
numerically distinct properties, or tropes. In characterizing an object, a trope plays the
role of a character-grounder. For example, each billiard ball is spherical in virtue of
having its own sphericality trope. Trope theory is a prominent theory about the exis-
tence and nature of properties. Leading defences include Williams [1953], Campbell
[1990], Maurin [2002], and Ehring [2011].
However, as I show in section 2, there is a largely unrecognized ambiguity concern-
ing the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two different conceptions of a trope,
each with different qualifications for doing metaphysical work. In sections 3 and 4, I
consider how each type of trope fares with respect to grounding the character of
objects. I argue that each faces unique implications and challenges concerning charac-
ter-grounding. In the final section I summarize and contrast their relative merits.
2. Two Types of Tropes
Consider a sphericality trope. Is the trope itself spherical? If so, then it is what I call a
module trope. If not, then it is what I call a modifier trope. We can illuminate the dis-
tinction by considering the catchphrase that ‘tropes are particularized properties’. This
Slogan is often used to introduce tropes by contrasting the concept of a trope with the
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concept of a universal, and specifically with that of an Armstrongian, generally non-
self-exemplifying, immanent universal.1 Thus, a trope is what you get when you ‘partic-
ularize’ a non-self-exemplifying universal. So understood, the Slogan is ambiguous
because ‘particularizing’ can be understood in a weak or a strong sense.
The weak way to particularize a property is simply to render it unshareable. Under-
stood this way, the Slogan says that the only difference between tropes and non-self-
exemplifying universals is that the latter are shareable and the former are not. Here, the
Slogan fixes on the concept of a modifier trope: a non-shareable and non-self-exempli-
fying property. On this view, a billiard ball is hard in virtue of its hardness trope and
spherical in virtue of its sphericality trope, but the hardness trope is not itself hard and
the sphericality trope is not itself spherical. Where O is a spherical object and s is O’s
sphericality trope, O is spherical but s is not. In this case, s does not confer or contribute
its own character to O. Rather, s confers character that is somehow grounded in and
produced by s’s own character. Put differently, a modifier trope is a non-paradigmatic
source of character, a characterizer which is not itself an epitomizer. Thus, with respect
to the character of the trope itself, on the modifier view a trope does not have the char-
acter that it grounds.
The second way to particularize a property is to convert it into a propertied-particular.
In this stronger sense, ‘particularizing a property’ involves ascribing objecthood to a prop-
erty. Here, particularization involves converting a shareable and singly characterizing
property (an immanent universal) into a non-shareable and thinly propertied object: a
module trope. So understood, the Slogan fixes on the concept of a module trope: a prim-
itively, naturally, and thinly charactered object.2 (Here, ‘natural’ character is understood
in the usual, albeit programmatic, sense of ‘carving nature at the joints’.) The billiard
ball, for example, is hard in virtue of its hardness trope and spherical in virtue of its
sphericality trope. But, on the module view, the hardness trope is itself (primitively) hard
and the sphericality trope is itself (primitively) spherical. Thus, with respect to the char-
acter of the trope itself, we may say that a module trope has the character that it grounds.
Note that, aside from the character that it grounds, a module trope has no other natural
character. A sphericality module trope, for example, would seem to be spherical but not
otherwise (naturally, non-formally) charactered.3
Although the modifier/module distinction is seldom recognized,4 it seems to track
and illuminate what Maurin [2014] describes as a ‘choice of model for the trope’,
between thinking of tropes as substances and thinking of tropes as properties. As she
sees it, the choice is ultimately inconsequential: ‘…tropes are by their nature such that
1 Instances of the Slogan fail to specify whether the relevant concept is that of a self-exemplifying or non-self-
exemplifying universal. However, the broader context points to the latter. For example, self-exemplification is
banned by Russell’s theory of types and suggested by discussions of the Third Man Argument in Loux [1978]
and Armstrong [1978].
2 This is the view I find in Williams [1953], Campbell [1990], and Maurin [2002]. In Ehring [2011], tropes generally
appear to be module tropes but they are not primitively natured; rather, a trope has the nature it does in virtue
of belonging to primitively natural classes.
3 Problems lurk concerning the degree to which a module trope is primitively charactered [Garcia forthcoming].
Nevertheless, it is clear that a module trope is is supposed to be less charactered than its bearer. Below, I assume
that module tropes are merely thinly charactered. My claims apply equally to a view on which a module trope is
only relatively thinly charactered—that is, on which it is less charactered than the object whose character the
trope grounds.
4 As I explain elsewhere [2015a: 133!4], I am indebted to Michael Loux for alerting me to this distinction. For rea-
sons offered there, I use ‘module trope’ for what Loux [2015: 31] calls a ‘troper’ and I use ‘modifier trope’ for
what Loux calls simply a ‘trope’.




























they can be adequately categorized both as a kind of property and as a kind of sub-
stance’ [ibid.: sec. 2.1]. I disagree. Rather than representing an inconsequential choice
between two ways of modelling a single kind of trope, the modifier/module distinction
reveals two fundamentally different ways of thinking about the character of a trope
itself—what I call trope-level character. As such, the distinction has a range of implica-
tions for the eligibility of tropes to do metaphysical work (see Garcia [2015a, forthcom-
ing]). My aim in this paper is to consider how each type of trope fares in doing the
specific work of character-grounding.
3. Modifier Tropes as Character-Grounders
Let’s begin by considering how modifier tropes fare as character-grounders. It will be
useful to compare a modifier trope to a truth-maker. Presumably, at least some truth-
making is irreflexive, where a truth-maker (verifier) is not itself true but makes some-
thing else true (a truth-bearer). Similarly, a modifier trope is what we might call a
character-maker in that it makes something else charactered, but is not itself charac-
tered in that way. (The latter caveat is necessary because it is misleading to say that a
modifier trope isn’t charactered at all. For example, although it is false that a spherical-
ity modifier trope is spherical, it is truly described as being charactered both formally—
being a property, being self-identical, being non-shareable, etc.—and functionally—
being a sphere-maker. Most trope theorists take the formal and functional character of
a trope to be primitive—not grounded in, say, higher-order tropes.) In other words,
character-making is irreflexive: if trope t is a character-maker, then t characterizes
something else—some x such that t 6¼ x. Call this numerically distinct ‘something else’
a ‘trope-bearer’. A trope-bearer is that which is characterized by a trope. Thus, for
example, where s is a sphericality modifier trope, s is a non-shareable non-spherical
sphere-maker and s’s bearer is spherical because it bears s.
Notice that character-making is a proper species of character-grounding. In general,
a character-grounder is that in virtue of which something is charactered in some way.
But this is consistent with the character-grounder itself being the something that is
charactered in the relevant way. In such a case, character-grounding would be reflexive.
In other words, as I construe it, character-grounding is not necessarily irreflexive.5
Moreover, it is desirable to think of character-grounding in this way. First, it allows for
character-grounding on theories that eschew properties altogether. On austere nomi-
nalism, for example, character-grounding would be reflexive in that the character-
grounders are nothing other than the ordinary, thickly charactered, objects themselves
(for more on austere nominalism see Carroll and Markosian [2010]). Second, it allows
for a version of module trope theory on which character-grounding is merely reflex-
ive—a view I discuss below. Accordingly, character-making is a special kind of charac-
ter-grounding: it is irreflexive character-grounding, where something non-identical
with the character-grounder is characterized by the character-grounder.
Importantly, on modifier trope theory, character-grounding must be character-mak-
ing. Otherwise, modifier tropes cannot play their intended role in accounting for either
of two related phenomena—what I call thin-character and thick-character.
5 Nothing of substance hangs on my working assumption that character-grounding is possibly reflexive. For dis-
cussion of (ir)reflexive grounding, see Schaffer [2009] and Rodriguez-Pereyra [2015].




























On the one hand, there is the phenomenon of thin-character. There are entities that
are at least thinly naturally charactered. (I use ‘entity’ as the most general count noun,
a catch-all and category-neutral term for any kind of thing.) As indicated by the quali-
fier ‘at least’, thin-character by itself does not require either that there are entities that
are only thinly charactered or that the thinly charactered entities are also more than
thinly charactered. Rather, there is thin-character because there is at least one entity x
that is (predicatively) F, where F is a non-formal and (non-conjunctive) natural prop-
erty. In the case of the billiard ball, there is an x that is spherical. The latter would be a
case of thin-character. I take the existence of thin-character to be a Moorean fact of the
highest order.
In its role as a character-grounder, each trope is supposed to account for thin-char-
acter. For example, a sphericality trope is supposed to account for the fact that some-
thing is spherical. But if tropes are modifiers, then the sphericality trope is not itself
spherical. Thus, the entity that is spherical must be something other than the spherical-
ity trope. Hence, on modifier trope theory, character-grounding must be character-
making, wherein a trope characterizes a numerically distinct entity by producing char-
acter at the object-level that is absent at the trope-level. For example, if s is a spherical-
ity modifier trope, then there is some x such that x 6¼ s and x is spherical in virtue of s.
To put the point differently: s spherizes x.
On the other hand, there is the phenomenon of thick-character. This occurs in vir-
tue of there being entities that are thickly naturally charactered. That is, because there
is at least one entity x that is F and is G, where F and G pick out distinct natural
properties.
Arguably, thick-character’s existing is a Moorean fact. It is a rather compelling and
pervasive feature of the manifest world. For example, where e is an electron, e is triply
charactered: e has mass (0.511 MeV/c2), e has spin (1/2), and e has charge (!1e). Closer
to hand, a sheet of paper is thickly charactered. It is, say, coloured (white), extended
(210mm £ 297mm £ 0.25mm), dense (800 kg/m3), textured (smooth), and porous (to
a degree that facilitates ink absorption). In some cases, an object’s having a causal
power is a function of its being thickly charactered. Lowe [2010: 19] observes this:
It is partly because a spherical object is spherical that it has a power to roll down an inclined
plane—only partly, because it doesn’t have such a power unless it is also heavy and rigid, unlike
a spherical soap bubble.
The object rolls in virtue of being thickly charactered—because the very same entity is
spherical, rigid, and heavy.
Accounting for thick-character is a principal motivation for postulating properties.
Campbell [1981: 481] calls it ‘the problem of concrete individuals’. Rodriguez-Pereyra
[2002: 46!9] calls it the ‘Many Over One’ problem and argues that it is the essence of
the perennial Problem of Universals. Moreover, presumably, a property theory is neces-
sarily true if true. Such a theory is adequate only if it can account for all possible charac-
ter-related phenomena. Because of this, a property theory that fails to account for
thick-character can be judged adequate only if there are non-ad hoc grounds for think-
ing that thick-character is impossible. However, even if thick-character turns out to be
illusory in our world, there seem to be no grounds for ruling out the possibility of
thick-character. More generally, a property theory that fails to account for thick-
character either is not true in all possible worlds or is committed to the impossibility of
502 ROBERT K. GARCIA
thick-character. For these reasons, a property theory that cannot account for thick-
character suffers from a significant, if not fatal, flaw.
As above, without character-making, a sphericality modifier trope cannot account
for the fact that something is spherical. Thus, a fortiori, without character-making, a
sphericality trope, a smoothness trope, and a hardness trope cannot jointly account for
the fact that a single entity is spherical, hard, and smooth. More generally, modifier
tropes can account for thick-character only if they are character-makers.
Thus, to ground character—thin or thick—modifier tropes must be character-mak-
ers. This has two important implications. First, because modifier tropes must be charac-
ter-makers and because character-making is irreflexive, modifier trope theory is
incompatible with the eliminativist view that, strictly speaking, there are no trope-
bearers (see Robb [2005] for discussion of eliminativism). Second, on modifier trope
theory, character-grounding must involve more than a part-whole relation. Because a
modifier trope does not have the character that it grounds, character-making must
involve the de novo production of novel character at the bearer-level—character not
present at the trope-level. But there is nothing in the concept of a part-whole relation
that involves or requires this. Suppose that s is a sphericality modifier trope—a non-
spherical sphere-maker, as it were. And suppose that s is a proper part of x. It trivially
follows that x has what I will call compositional character, in that we might describe x
as being such as to have a proper part that is a sphere-maker. But it follows neither that
x is spherical nor that x is spherical in virtue of having s as a part. Indeed, even on the
reasonable assumption that s exists only if there is something distinct from s that is
made spherical by s, it doesn’t follow from s’s being a part of y that y is the something
that is made spherical by s. Thus, character-making is not reducible to parthood, and
indeed seems to be sui generis.
These implications bear on how modifier tropes fare as character-grounders. Here
are three upshots.
First, consider the character-making required for character-grounding. This seems
to be precisely the kind of sui generis exemplification relation that substances and prop-
erties stand in on a poly-category substance-attribute ontology. On such a view, a prop-
erty-bearer is the literal subject of predication, such that a bearer is characterized (for
example, spherized) by a property. According to D.C. Williams, however, trope theory
is supposed to enjoy the advantage of ‘dispel[ing] the ancient mystery of predication’
by replacing a sui generis exemplification relation with an ordinary part-whole relation
[1953: 11]. Unfortunately, on modifier trope theory this mystery is not dispelled. Char-
acter-grounding requires sui generis non-parthood character-making. Thus, with
respect to its analysis of predication, modifier trope theory fails to enjoy an advantage
over a realist poly-category ontology on which substances exemplify universals.
Second, on modifier trope theory, the relationship between modifier tropes and
trope-bearers involves sui generis character-making, whereby (say) a non-spherical
entity spherizes another entity. Thus, a trope-bearer is a characterizable kind of entity
whereas a modifier trope is a characterizing kind of entity. It seems, then, that the dif-
ference between modifier tropes and their bearers is as significant as the difference
between substances and attributes on a poly-category ontology. This suggests that mod-
ifier tropes require a poly-category ontology and, thus, that a modifier trope bundle the-
ory is a non-starter.
Third, if there are trope-bearers, then understanding the relationship between tropes
and trope-bearers requires understanding how trope-level character compares to




























object-level (trope-bearer-level) character. Below, we will see how this issue presents the
module trope theorist with an important choice. But, for modifier tropes, this matter is
straightforward: there appears to be no (natural, non-formal) similarity between a
modifier trope and its bearer. For example, because a sphericality modifier trope is not
itself spherical, its trope-level character is exhausted in its being a sphere-maker—in its
being something that spherizes something else. This, however, suggests that the concept
of a modifier trope is a functional concept: a modifier trope is defined in terms of what
it does, in terms of its characterizing effects. But specifying the role played by a modifier
trope—saying what it does—is not sufficient to specify the intrinsic nature of the entity
playing that role. This indeterminacy casts a shadow over modifier trope theory.
4. Module Tropes as Character-Grounders
I have argued that modifier trope theory can account for thin- and thick-character only
if character-grounding involves character-making, which is sui generis and irreducible
to parthood. On module trope theory, the situation is importantly different. Here,
tropes themselves secure thin-character. Because a sphericality module trope is itself
spherical, its existence accounts for the fact that something is spherical. Thus, the mod-
ule view can account for thin-character without character-making and without the pos-
tulation of trope-bearers. As I explain in the final section, this is an advantage of
module tropes.
But accounting for thick-character is not so simple with module tropes. To antici-
pate, I will argue that, on module trope theory, accounting for thick-character requires
character-grounding to involve sui generis character-making, which may be grounded
in but is irreducible to mere parthood or mere colocation (or both).
To begin, the mere existence of module tropes cannot account for thick-character.
Suppose that module tropes sphericality1, rigidity1, and heaviness1 exist. These tropes
are only thinly charactered: sphericality1 is spherical but neither heavy nor rigid, rigid-
ity1 is rigid but neither spherical nor heavy, and heaviness1 is heavy but neither spheri-
cal nor rigid. Thus, their existence in no way suggests this:
(TC) There is an x, such that x is spherical, rigid, and heavy.
For (TC) to be the case, there must be something other than module tropes.
Many trope theorists appeal to mereological composition, so let’s further suppose
that there are wholes composed of module tropes and that the following obtains:
(C) There is a whole, O, composed of sphericality1, rigidity1, and heaviness1.
Clearly, (C) does not entail (TC). First, there is nothing in the concept of parthood that
underwrites an inference from (C) to (TC). In fact, drawing this inference would
involve several violations of the compositional fallacy, each of the following form: If x
(e.g. sphericality1) is a proper part of y (O) and Fx (sphericality1 is spherical), then Fy
(O is spherical). This inference pattern is fallacious because a whole need not have the
properties of its proper parts: a whole composed of simples is not simple; a whole com-
posed of a sphere and a cube is not, per impossibile, both spherical and cubical; etc.
Thus, the fact that a spherical-thing, a rigid-thing, and a heavy-thing compose a whole
does not by itself ensure that the whole is spherical, rigid, and heavy. Second, (C) says
nothing about the spatial proximity of sphericality1, rigidity1, and heaviness1. But if O is
supposed to be spherical, rigid, and heavy in virtue of having those tropes as proper




























parts, then presumably those tropes must be intimately spatially related and not, say, on
different planets. Thus, taking module tropes to compose a whole will not, by itself,
account for thick-character and warrant an inference from (C) to (TC).
To supply the requisite kind of spatial intimacy, suppose that we add co-location to
composition. Continuing our example, suppose that this is the case:
(CC) There is a whole, O, composed of co-located tropes sphericality1, rigidity1, and heaviness1.
To use a term introduced above, I will say that something is compositionally F if it has a
proper part that is F. Because each trope mentioned in (CC) is itself thinly charactered,
it follows from (CC) that O has what I will call complex compositional character:
(CCC) There is a whole, O, such that O has a proper part that is spherical, a proper part that is
rigid, and a proper part that is heavy, where these parts are numerically distinct but co-located.
Unless wholes with co-located parts are exempt from the compositional fallacy, an
inference from (CCC) to (TC) will violate the fallacy, no less than an inference from
(C) to (TC) will do so. But it is hard to see how the mere co-location of a whole’s parts
would suffice to exempt the whole from the compositional fallacy.
To underwrite the inference from (CCC) to (TC), we need to take on board a char-
acter-inheritance principle, such as this:
(CI) If z is (at least partly) composed of x and y, where Fx, Gy, and x and y are co-located, then
Fz and Gz.
If (CI) is true, however, it is not true in virtue of the operative concepts of co-location
and mereological composition. To see why, consider a popular solution to the problem
of material constitution. On the constitution view (or ‘colocationism’), it is possible for
two material objects to occupy simultaneously the same exact spatial location.
Although a lump of clay (Lump) constitutes a statue (David), Lump and David are
non-identical and have different properties. Lump has the property of being squash-
able; David does not.
Now, either Lump and David compose a whole, or they do not. If (CI) is true, how-
ever, then it is impossible that Lump and David do so, on pain of allowing for an
incompossibly charactered object. For example, if Lump and David compose a whole
and (CI) is true, then the object they compose is both squashable and non-squashable.
Thus, (CI) rules out the possibility that Lump and David compose a whole. For similar
reasons, more generally, (CI) entails that the constitution view is incompatible with
universalism (unrestricted mereological composition). But it is hard to see how the
concepts of co-location and composition together either rule out the possibility that
Lump and David compose a whole or entail that the constitution view is incompatible
with universalism. Indeed, if they do rule out the possibility that Lump and David com-
pose a whole, then presumably they rule out the possibility that any co-located objects
compose a whole. But if so, then those concepts rule out the very tropist strategy under
consideration—namely, the strategy of accounting for thick-character by taking co-
located module tropes to compose a whole. In sum, (CI) has implications that go
beyond what the concepts of co-location and composition would warrant. Thus, if (CI)
is true, it is not true simply in virtue of those concepts. By themselves, these concepts
do not underwrite an inference from (CCC) to (TC).
Of course, to account for thick-character—to underwrite the inference from (CCC)
to (TC)—a module trope theorist is within her rights to take (CI) to be true. However,




























because (CI) is not true in virtue of the operative concepts of co-location and composi-
tion, taking (CI) to be true significantly expands the ideology of module trope theory.
On such a theory, (CI) would be axiomatic. A commitment to (CI) is also significant in
that, as noted above, it rules out certain seemingly coherent views about material
constitution.
To avoid these further commitments, a module trope theorist might eschew thick-
character altogether. I consider such a move in section 4.3. If not, however, she faces a
pair of implications similar to those faced by the modifier trope theorist.
First, taking (CI) to be true amounts to holding that, as a primitive fact, a module
trope is the kind of thing that brings it about that something else is charactered in the
same way in which the trope is charactered. For example, sphericality1 is a spherical
entity that makes something else spherical: sphericality1 spherizes O. Thus, although the
thick-character of an ordinary object is grounded in its module tropes, it cannot be
reduced to the character of its module tropes. For example, although the thick-character
of the billiard ball is grounded in its thinly charactered tropes, only the ball is thickly
charactered. Thick-character appears at the object-level and not the trope-level. In this
way, on module trope theory, accounting for thick-character requires character-
grounding to be irreflexive and irreducible to parthood-plus-co-location. That is, char-
acter-grounding must involve sui generis character-making.
Second, because thick-character only appears at the object-level, module tropes must
engage in collaborative character-making, whereby they jointly characterize a numeri-
cally distinct entity—a trope-bearer. Thus, to account for thick-character, module trope
theory requires both character-making and trope-bearers. Eliminativism regarding
trope-bearers is not an option.
Above, we saw that these implications gave rise to three upshots concerning how
modifier tropes fare as character-grounders. The upshots for module tropes are inter-
estingly different.
First, for either kind of trope, accounting for thick-character requires sui generis
character-making. However, for module tropes, character-grounding involves the
reproduction of trope-level character, whereas for modifier tropes it involves the de
novo production of novel character (producing character not found at the trope-level).
Perhaps, then, the sort of character-making required for module tropes is less mysteri-
ous than the sort required for modifier tropes, and, by extension, less mysterious than
the sort of primitive exemplification found on a substance-attribute scheme. I leave this
for the reader to decide.
Second, module tropes and their bearers differ primarily with respect to the degree
to which they are charactered: the trope is thinly charactered whereas its bearer is
thickly charactered (where in both cases the sort of character is natural, such as being
spherical, massive, etc.). Thus, in contrast to modifier tropes, it is not implausible to
deploy module tropes within a mono-category ontology.
Third, if there are trope-bearers, then understanding character-grounding requires
understanding the way in which trope-level character compares to object-level charac-
ter (trope-bearer-level character). Above, I noted that although this matter is straight-
forward on modifier trope theory—there being no natural similarity between a
modifier trope and its bearer—it does suggest that the concept of a modifier trope is a
functional concept. Module trope theory, however, faces a choice between two views on
how trope-level character compares to object-level character. After distinguishing these
views, I will discuss their merits.




























Collaborative character-making requires the trope-bearer to be a numerically distinct
entity that is itself charactered in virtue of its tropes. Because of this, the module trope
theorist faces an important question: relative to the way in which a given module trope
is charactered, in what sense is a trope-bearer charactered (in virtue of that trope)? For
example, consider a sphericality module trope and its bearer. Are these entities spherical
in the same sense? As this question suggests, on module trope theory there are two ways
to think about character-making.
On the one hand, there is univocal-character making, where the univocity pertains
to the character that is made and not to the making per se. In other words, this is a gen-
uine species of character-making, and it involves the making of univocal-character in
that the sense in which the trope-bearer is (made to be) charactered is the same sense
in which its character-maker is (primitively) charactered. In its role as a character-
maker, a sphericality module trope makes a (partial) replica of itself—it makes some-
thing else spherical. Thus, no equivocation is involved in attributing the same character
to both the trope and its bearer. A sphericality module trope is spherical and its bearer
is spherical, without any equivocation on ‘spherical’. Here, character-making is
replicative.
On the other hand, there is equivocal-character making. Again, the equivocity per-
tains to the character that is made. This type of character-making involves the (genu-
ine) making of equivocal-character, in that the sense in which the trope-bearer is
(made to be) charactered is not the same as the sense in which its character-maker is
(primitively) charactered. Here, a sphericality trope is spherical and its bearer is spheri-
cal, but they are not spherical in the same sense. We equivocate when attributing
‘spherical’ to them.
I will now argue that the choice between univocal-character making and equivocal-
character making is significant, as each view has advantages and disadvantages.
4.1 Univocal-Character Making
First consider univocal-character making. Recall that all character-making is irreflexive:
if a trope is a character-maker, then it characterizes something else—a trope-bearer. For
example, if s is a sphericality trope and a character-maker, then there is an x such that
x 6¼ s and x is spherical (in virtue of s). On the modifier view, s would be a non-spheri-
cal sphere-maker and x would be a spherical trope-bearer. Thus, between s and x there
would be only one sphere. But on the module view there is s, the spherical sphere-
maker, along with x, the spherical trope-bearer. And if the use of ‘spherical’ here is
univocal—if character-making is univocal-character making—then the trope-bearer is
spherical in the very same sense in which the character-maker is spherical. Thus, unless
there is an equivocation on ‘spherical’, character-making yields two spheres. In other
words, wherever there is a sphericality module trope that is a univocal-character maker,
there are two numerically distinct spherical entities: the spherical trope and an entity
which is spherical in virtue of that trope. This generalizes: if module tropes are univo-
cal-character makers, then, wherever you have an F-ness trope, you have two numeri-
cally distinct F-things.




























A similar kind of character duplication is alleged to arise on other philosophical
views.6 Consider the aforementioned constitution view. Because Lump and David are
composed of the same basic material parts, a well-known problem is that of avoiding
the implication that each weighs (say) 5.5 tons. This (alleged) character duplication is
similar to the duplication that results if module tropes are univocal-character makers:
there is a numerically unique sphere (a spherical trope) grounding the shape of each
ordinary sphere. In this way, univocal-character making saddles module trope theory
with the systematic duplication of character.
Importantly, on trope theory, ordinary objects and their tropes are supposed to be
denizens of the same realm (usually taken to be the spatio-temporal realm). Thus, if
module tropes are univocal-character makers, then we get character duplication within
the same realm. If there is an ordinary spherical object at a certain time and place, then
there is also a spherical trope at that time and place—two spheres at the same time and
place.
This presents the module trope theorist with an important choice concerning causa-
tion. Suppose that our billiard ball is resting on a pillow. In this case, it is natural to say
that the sphericality of the ball is directly causing the pillow top to have a concave
shape. But if tropes are module tropes and univocal-character makers, then there are
two spheres on the pillow: the sphericality trope and its bearer. Presumably, at least
one of the spheres is directly responsible for the concavity of the pillow top. But which
one? Or is it both?
Alternative 1. Take both spheres to be responsible. That is, more generally, take both
module tropes and their bearers to play a direct causal role. This alternative is encum-
bered with systematic causal overdetermination. To avoid this, the module trope theo-
rist must take one of the spheres to be causally impotent. In other words, if module
tropes are univocal-character makers, then on pain of overdetermination either module
tropes or their bearers are epiphenomenal.
Alternative 2. Avoid overdetermination, by taking module tropes to be epiphenome-
nal. Recall that, because module tropes are only thinly charactered, thick-character is
an object-level phenomenon—only trope-bearers are thickly charactered. Thus, by
assigning causal potency to (only) trope-bearers, this alternative has the virtue of safe-
guarding the causal relevance of thick-character. Unfortunately, there are two signifi-
cant downsides. First, many trope theorists hold that tropes, unlike universals, are
suited to play a direct role in causation and perception (Campbell [1981], Ehring
[2011], and Maurin [2014]). On Alternative 2, this important advantage is lost. Second,
arguably, because a modifier trope is not naturally charactered (a mass modifier trope
is not massive), it is ineligible to play a direct role in causation or in perception [Garcia
forthcoming]. If so, then Alternative 2 puts module tropes on a par with modifier
tropes with respect to causal relevance. And, as previously noted, both modifier and
module tropes require trope-bearers to account for thick character. Thus, it is unclear
how Alternative 2 is significantly different from or better than modifier trope theory.
Call this downside the parity problem.
Alternative 3. Avoid overdetermination by taking trope-bearers to be epiphenome-
nal. Here, module tropes are eligible to play a direct role in causation and perception—
6 Bailey [2012] raises a character-duplication problem for bare particulars; see Pickavance [2014] for a reply.
Another example is the ‘Two Many Thinkers’ problem for psychological approaches to personal identity.




























safeguarding the important advantage of tropes over universals that is lost on Alterna-
tive 2. However, as before, thick-character is an object-level phenomenon. Only trope-
bearers are thickly charactered. Thus, if trope-bearers are epiphenomenal, then so is
thick-character. That is, nothing that is thickly charactered could play a causal role. It
might be possible for a number of thinly charactered entities (the module tropes) to
jointly bring about an effect. But causation could not involve a thickly charactered
entity bringing about an effect, whether acting as a singular cause or as a contributing
one. Thus, on Alternative 3 all thickly charactered objects are ineligible to play a causal
role. This would seem to impose surprising, if not unacceptable, restrictions on the
nature of causation and the content of causal laws. Moreover, it is not clear that having
epiphenomenal thick-character is any better than, or different from, not having thick-
character at all.
Those are the respective costs of Alternatives 2 and 3. But these alternatives share a
more significant problem: each seems at odds with its intended aim of taking module
tropes to be univocal-character makers. Notice that each must tolerate not just epiphe-
nomenal entities but also naturally charactered epiphenomenal entities, such as massive
or spherical entities. Unfortunately, it is unclear how a naturally charactered entity
could be causally impotent. Consider a mass trope. Alternatives 2 and 3 accept univo-
cal-character making and, thus, that both the mass trope and its bearer are massive.
But each alternative takes one of these massive entities to be epiphenomenal. However,
it is hard to see how this is possible—unless it involves a tacit equivocation on ‘massive’.
Indeed, it seems that taking only one of the massive entities to be epiphenomenal
makes sense only if we abandon the univocity of character attributions between module
tropes and their bearers. Thus, both strategies for avoiding overdetermination by way
of epiphenomenalism seem ultimately incompatible with univocal-character making. It
seems, in other words, that Alternatives 2 and 3 are not genuine alternatives for univo-
cal-character making, after all. In the next section I will consider how these alternatives
fare if retooled in terms of equivocal-character making.
We’ve been considering module tropes in their role as character-grounders. Previ-
ously, we saw that, without collaborative and sui generis character-making, module
tropes cannot account for thick-character. Collaborative character-making, in turn,
requires a trope-bearer for tropes to characterize jointly. A trope-bearer is charactered
either in the very same sense as its module trope or not. Accordingly, module tropes
can be understood as either univocal-character makers or equivocal-character makers.
The former involves character duplication, which forebodes causal overdetermination.
This presents three choices. Alternatives 2 and 3 avoid overdetermination, but each has
its disadvantages and both seem incompatible with univocal-character making. This
leaves Alternative 1, which seems to offer the best and perhaps the only strategy for tak-
ing module tropes to be univocal-character makers. Unfortunately, it secures the exis-
tence and causal potency of thick-character at the price of overdetermination.
Theorists choosing Alternative 1 should make peace with overdetermination or find a
way to avoid overdetermination while affirming both univocal-character making and
the causal potency of both module tropes and their bearers. This would require finding
a plausible way to affirm—without equivocation on ‘massive’—that, although a mass
trope is massive and its bearer is massive, it is not the case that the effects of one are
overdetermined by the other.





























Let’s now consider how module tropes fare as equivocal-character makers. To take
module tropes to be equivocal-character makers is to adopt what I call an equivocation
strategy. This strategy aims to avoid duplication problems by denying that a trope-
bearer is (naturally) charactered in the same sense as any of its tropes. Here, although a
mass trope and its bearer are each massive, they are not massive in the same sense.
It is difficult to determine the prospects of this strategy. As it stands, the strategy is
programmatic in that it does not identify any specific sense in which a trope is charac-
tered relative to the sense in which its bearer is charactered. For example, the mere
denial of univocity does not settle the question of the specific difference between the
sense in which a module trope is massive and the sense in which its bearer is massive.
Moreover, because the modifier/module distinction is relatively unappreciated, it is dif-
ficult to determine whether and when the latter question has been addressed. This
makes it hard to say with confidence that any given trope theorist has deployed an
equivocation strategy.
These difficulties limit how far we can go in assessing the strategy. Nevertheless, I
proceed by proposing an adequacy criterion and three desiderata. As to the former,
clearly, any adequate equivocation strategy will not merely deny univocity, but will also
identify the specific sense in which a trope is charactered relative to the sense in which
its bearer is charactered. As to the desiderata, it is desirable that a given strategy provide
the needed specificity in a way that (i) avoids the character duplication problems that
arise on univocal-character making, (ii) does justice to thick-character, and (iii)
explains how trope-level character grounds object-level character. With the criterion
and desiderata in mind, I now consider how Alternatives 2 and 3 fare if retooled as
equivocation strategies.
Consider what we may call Alternative 20. As with Alternative 2, we secure thick-
character by allowing for character-making that is sui generis and collaborative,
whereby module tropes jointly bring it about that their bearer is thickly charactered.
And, as with Alternative 2, we avoid overdetermination by taking module tropes to be
epiphenomenal. Thus, Alternative 20 fares well on the first and second desiderata. As
noted previously, Alternative 2 is vexed by the seeming incompatibility of holding both
that a sphericality trope and its bearer are spherical in the same sense and that only
one of these spheres is eligible to play an immediate causal role. Because Alternative 20
takes tropes to be equivocal-character makers, it avoids this worry.
Notwithstanding these merits, it seems that, overall, Alternative 20 is not a promising
equivocation strategy. It inherits Alternative 2’s first downside and exacerbates its second,
the parity problem. Because Alternative 20 takes character-making to be sui generis, a
trope produces object-level character that is irreducible to trope-level character. For
example, an object is spherical in more than the (compositional) sense of having a spher-
ical proper part. And because character-making is equivocal, object-level character and
trope-level character are qualitatively different. Thus, Alternative 20 does little to dispel
the mystery of predication. Consequently, it fails to satisfy the third desideratum and, in
addition, exacerbates the parity problem because it is unclear how Alternative 20 is differ-
ent from or better than a modifier trope theory that allows for sui generis and collabora-
tive character-making. Furthermore, although the view takes a trope-bearer to be
spherical in virtue of having a spherical trope, the sense in which the trope is spherical is
neither the same as the sense in which its bearer is spherical nor a sense that enables it




























to play a direct causal role. Thus, the view falls short of identifying the specific sense in
which a module trope is charactered relative to the sense in which its bearer is charac-
tered. Thus, Alternative 20 fares poorly on the adequacy criterion. In sum, although
Alternative 20 improves slightly on Alternative 2, overall there is little to recommend it.
4.3 Thaumatrope Theory
As a more promising approach, Alternative 3 may also be retooled as an equivocation
strategy. Indeed, a developed version of this approach can be found in the work of D.C.
Williams [1953]. As I read him, Williams was a module trope theorist who took tropes
to be equivocal-character makers. I cannot defend this interpretation here, so those
who read him differently are invited to regard what follows as a Williams-inspired
view. My main interest is to discuss an equivocation strategy that meets the adequacy
criterion and goes some distance towards satisfying the desiderata. Whether Williams
actually deployed the strategy is less important.
By my lights, Williams takes ordinary objects to be sums of co-located module
tropes. More importantly, his analysis of object-level character suggests that a trope
and its bearer are not charactered in the same sense—that tropes are not univocal char-
acter-makers. Thus, for Williams, trope-bearers are sums of module tropes and charac-
ter-grounding is not univocal-character making. This suggests the following picture.
Strictly speaking, a sphericality trope is spherical but its bearer is not. Where O is a
trope-bearer and sphericality1 is a module trope, if sphericality1 is a proper part of O,
then, strictly speaking, O is not itself spherical. Rather (to use a term introduced above),
O is only compositionally spherical: O’s being ‘spherical’ is nothing more than O’s hav-
ing a proper part that is spherical. In other words, O is ‘spherical’ only in the equivocal
sense of ‘having a proper part that is spherical’. Here we equivocate if we attribute
‘spherical’ to both a trope and its bearer. Thus, more generally, a trope and its bearer
are not charactered in the same sense.
This account of object-level character involves an equivocation strategy that satisfies
the above adequacy criterion and the first and third desiderata. It provides a specific
and positive sense in which a trope-bearer is charactered relative to its trope: the com-
positional sense. A trope-bearer is (say) spherical only in the sense that it has a spherical
proper part. Thus, the account avoids the duplication of character (first desideratum)
and provides a straightforward explanation of how trope-level character grounds
object-level character (third desideratum).
Unfortunately, the above account satisfies the first desideratum by frustrating the
second. Because a trope characterizes its bearer only compositionally, the kind of
object-level character that results from collaborative character-making is only complex
compositional character. For example, in virtue of having sphericality1, rigidity1, and
heaviness1 as parts, a bearer, O, has a proper part that is spherical, a proper part that is
rigid, and a proper part that is heavy. But, strictly speaking, it is false that O is spherical,
rigid, and heavy. However, given that module tropes are only thinly charactered, if
trope-bearers have only complex compositional character, then nothing is thickly
charactered.
So understood, Williams’s account dispenses with thick-character. Here, thick-char-
acter is an illusion somehow produced by the intimacy (for instance, the co-location)
of thinly charactered objects (module tropes). Accordingly, we may call this Thauma-
trope Theory. (A thaumatrope is a toy that creates the illusion of thick-character. A




























common thaumatrope is a disk with a picture of a bird on one side and a picture of a
cage on the other. Rapidly rotating the card creates the illusion of a bird in a cage.) By
taking thick-character to be illusory, Thaumatrope Theory fails to satisfy the second
desideratum.
This failure is significant, for at least three reasons. First, without thick-character, it
is hard to see how we can account for certain higher-level causal powers. Recall the
example concerning a spherical object’s power to roll down an inclined plane. As Lowe
[2010: 19] suggests, the object has this power because it is itself spherical, heavy, and
rigid. Unless the object is itself charactered in all three of these ways—unless it is thickly
charactered—it is hard to see how it could have the power to roll down a plane. On
Thaumatrope Theory, however, the object on the plane is spherical, heavy, and rigid
only in a compositional sense. That is, strictly speaking, it is not the case that something
on the plane is spherical, heavy, and rigid. Rather, there is something on the plane that
has three co-located proper parts: a spherical part that is neither heavy nor rigid, a
heavy part that is neither rigid nor spherical, and a rigid part that is neither spherical
nor heavy. But on such a picture it is hard to see how there is anything on the plane
that has the power to roll. In sum, by dispensing with thick-character, Thaumatrope
Theory seems unable to account for certain higher-level powers.
Second, as before, presumably, a property theory is necessarily true if true. If so, then
Thaumatrope Theory’s equivocation-strategy is adequate only if it can account for all
possible character-related phenomena. Thus, because it eschews thick-character, this
strategy is adequate only if thick-character is impossible. In this way, Thaumatrope
Theory involves a commitment to the impossibility of thick-character. By my lights,
this marks a major weakness.
Third, as previously explained, accounting for thick-character is arguably the central
motivation for postulating properties in the first place [Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002:
46!9], and trope theorists aim to account for it (see, for example, Campbell [1981:
481]). Thus, a theory on which thick-character is illusory—or even impossible—suffers
a significant diminution of motivation and explanatory power.
To summarize: failing to satisfy the second desideratum saddles Thaumatrope The-
ory with significant disadvantages.7 Nevertheless, it offers a natural way to deploy an
equivocation strategy, one that is especially in keeping with trope bundle theories. And
it offers a specific sense in which trope-bearers are charactered relative to their tropes,
thus discharging the obligation incumbent on any equivocation strategy—the adequacy
criterion—to do more than deny univocity. This is especially important because if the
bearer of a module trope is neither univocally nor compositionally charactered, then it
is unclear in what sense it could be charactered.
7 The above equivocation strategy could also be deployed by a realist bundle theorist who took universals to be
self-exemplifying and who wished to avoid problems stemming from having both thinly charactered entities
(self-exemplifying universals) and thickly charactered entities (bundles of universals). The realist could adopt a
version of Thaumatrope Theory by holding that, strictly speaking, bundles of universals are not thickly charac-
tered but have only complex compositional character. This view inherits the disadvantages noted for tropist
Thaumatrope Theory. I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this.





























The modifier/module distinction reveals two views about the nature of a trope and has
important implications for the eligibility of tropes to do metaphysical work. There are
other considerations that bear on the relative merits of modifier tropes and module
tropes (see Garcia [2015a, forthcoming]), but here I have considered how each type of
trope fares as a character-grounder. On this score, I have argued that each faces unique
implications and challenges.
I will conclude by summarizing and contrasting their relative merits with respect to
character-grounding. Some choice points will emerge, choices that largely turn on the
relative importance of two desiderata: accounting for thick-character and securing the
eligibility of tropes to play a direct role in causation and perception.
As before, arguably, modifier tropes are not eligible to play a direct role in causation
and in perception [Garcia forthcoming]. Thus, if securing this eligibility is non-negotia-
ble, then module tropes are preferable to modifier tropes. However, it is unclear
whether a viable module trope theory can secure this eligibility while also accounting
for thick-character.
On both views, accounting for thick-character requires that (i) character-grounding
is sui generis character-making, irreducible to parthood-plus-co-location, (ii) trope-
bearers exist along with tropes, and (iii) tropes are character-makers that jointly charac-
terize trope-bearers. These requirements suggest that modifier tropes are better suited
than module tropes to account for thick-character. This is so, for two reasons. First, the
existence of trope-bearers threatens to make module tropes unnecessary. A trope-
bearer plays the role of that which is characterized. It is a subject of predication, some-
thing which is charactered (is spherical, massive, etc.). If trope-bearers exist, they play
this role. But if trope-bearers play this role, then we lose a rationale for taking tropes to
play it—that is, we lose a rationale for taking tropes themselves to be charactered.
Thus, a trope theorist who seeks an account of thick-character has good reason to pair
trope-bearers with modifier tropes rather than with module tropes. Second, the above
requirements raise an important question concerning the sense in which a trope is
charactered relative to the sense in which its bearer is charactered.
On modifier trope theory, the answer to the question is straightforward: there is no
natural similarity between a trope and its bearer. This suggests that the concept of a
modifier trope is a functional concept—a fly in the ointment, perhaps. The latter inde-
terminacy and the ineligibility to play a direct causal role are two disadvantages of
modifier tropes. The significance of these disadvantages is debatable, although by my
lights they are not prohibitive.8 Notwithstanding these drawbacks, modifier tropes
seem to allow for a viable account of thick-character.
On module trope theory, there are two ways to answer the above question, stem-
ming from two general ways to think about the sense in which a module trope is char-
actered relative to the sense in which its bearer is charactered. Taking the sense to be
univocal leads to character duplication, which forebodes causal overdetermination.
This threat is dodged by Alternatives 2 and 3, but each has disadvantages and both
seem incompatible with univocal-character making. This leaves Alternative 1, which
succeeds in securing thick-character without violating univocity, but does so at the
8 Towards resolving the indeterminacy, elsewhere [2015b] I propose a version of modifier trope theory—theistic
conferralism—on which modifier tropes are identical with certain divine acts.




























significant and perhaps prohibitive cost of overdetermination. On the other hand, a
module trope theorist may avoid these difficulties by taking the relevant sense to be
equivocal, thereby deploying an equivocation strategy. One such strategy, Alternative
20, has little to recommend it. The most promising strategy, Thaumatrope Theory,
comes at the cost of taking thick-character to be illusory. It is unclear how else to
deploy an equivocation strategy and, unfortunately, a merely programmatic strategy
does not solve the duplication problem but instead only labels it. Thus, a module trope
theory that requires an account of thick-character seems to face a choice between either
accepting overdetermination (Alternative 1) or finding an equivocation strategy that
attributes more than complex compositional character to trope-bearers while avoiding
problematic character duplication. I’ve offered reasons to doubt that a suitable equivo-
cation strategy is in the cards.
If these assessments are apt, then a trope theorist should either accept overdetermi-
nation, or reject thick-character, or reject module tropes. Thus, if thick-character is
non-negotiable, then a trope theorist should either choose module tropes at the cost of
overdetermination or choose modifier tropes at the cost of giving up the eligibility
of tropes to play a direct causal and perceptual role. By my lights, overdetermination
is the more prohibitive cost. Thus, I take the above considerations to suggest that a
trope theorist who seeks an account of thick-character would do best to go with modi-
fier tropes.
In contrast, a trope theorist willing to do without thick-character would do best to
go with module tropes. A modifier trope theorist seeking to secure any degree of char-
acter—thin or thick—requires both sui generis character-making and a poly-category
ontology that includes trope-bearers. But a module trope theorist seeking to secure
only thin-character can adopt Thaumatrope Theory and set aside both of those require-
ments. Thus, if an account of thick-character is not required, then choosing module
tropes would seem to make for the more parsimonious view. In addition, it would
secure the eligibility of tropes to play a direct role in causation and in perception. These
are two pro tanto advantages of Thaumatrope Theory. Of course, they constitute an all-
things-considered advantage only if there are no counterbalancing disadvantages in
giving up on thick-character. Above, I noted several disadvantages. Whether they are
counterbalancing remains to be seen.9
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